



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

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Pakistan's New Power Elite

by Stanley Maron

On October 27, 1958 General Mohammed Ayub Khan, in a bloodless coup, took over power in Pakistan after ousting General Iskander Mirza, who had assumed the presidency in March 1956 and had imposed martial law on October 7, 1958. In declaring martial law, President Mirza abrogated the 1956 constitution, dismissed the cabinet, dissolved the national Parliament and the provincial legislatures, disbanded all political parties and named Ayub Khan martial law administrator. On October 24, Mirza, under pressure from Ayub Khan, appointed the general to the premiership. President Mirza resigned on October 27 and took up residence in England, and Ayub Khan became chief of state.

The significance of the October 27 coup lies in the new power elite which it brought to the fore. The major difference between the Mirza and the Ayub groups is that the new elite thinks it can do the job better than the old one—and so far it has been proving that it can.

The old power elite was made up, for the most part, of landowners from West Pakistan who had roots deep in the tradition of the Delhi Sultanate. They represented the last vestige of the once dominant Muslim ruling

elite, the group which controlled the Muslim League, formed in 1906, throughout its history, even after membership had been thrown open to the masses during the 1936-37 election campaigns. Once Pakistan had been founded after the 1947 partition of the Indian subcontinent, this group, in alliance with prominent members of the civil service and with the tacit consent of the military, assumed control of the new nation and proceeded to run it as autocratically as it had run the Muslim League.

All the newly independent non-Western countries have in common the need for rapid economic development, and Pakistan is no exception. But in its case the immediate interests of the old elite lay directly athwart the path of genuine development. Pakistan is primarily an agricultural country, and any fundamental improvement must start out with the agricultural base. Change, however, could come only after the nation's agrarian economy had been rationalized. This required land reforms to break up uneconomic concentrations of holdings. The large landowners who comprised the pre-1958 power elite stood to lose by such reforms, and used their position to block any moves in that direction.

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The problem was due not only to the size of the holdings, but also to the fact that the landowners generally proved incompetent managers of their property. The landowners were not willing to reinvest part of their profits in order to safeguard or improve the productivity of the soil. The result was that West Pakistan, once a surplus area, became a deficit area. According to a speech delivered by Pakistan's Ambassador to the United States, Aziz Ahmed, on April 29, Pakistan had to import almost half a billion dollars worth of food during the past three years. This is a startling development for a country with a predominantly agricultural economy. Moreover, of the areas newly brought under irrigation, large tracts remained uncultivated because of political or administrative delays in distribution.

The net result was that political pressure deterred the development of agriculture. Instead, emphasis was placed on industry, with the aim of thus converting Pakistan into a "modern" nation. Many factories were built, but the economy as a whole was not sufficiently strong to support the new industries, and soon the factories ran short of foreign currency allocations for the raw materials they needed to import.

Not all industries suffered from a shortage of raw materials, however. The jute mills in East Pakistan, for example, were in a favorable competitive position because they could take the pick of the locally grown jute crop and then offer superior manufactured products on the world

market. But even these factories have had their problems, chiefly in the form of labor disturbances.

Land Reform Speeded

By the end of the first decade of independence, Pakistan showed little tangible improvement in the overall well-being of its people. This was partly due not only to the action of the ruling elite in blocking agricultural progress, but also to the corruption and inefficiency of the political leaders. Shortly before the October 1958 coup, the Minister of Finance had stated that out of the total foreign aid of \$839 million (of which \$703 million was contributed by the United States), only \$186 million had been spent on capital construction and equipment; the balance had been spent to keep existing industries going or to purchase food. Since the 1958 coup, the new leaders have disclosed widespread corruption under the previous regime.

The action of the military in taking control of power was inspired by their concern with the nation's failing economy. At the rate events were moving, not only were the people becoming increasingly disaffected, but before long budgetary requirements would have forced a reduction in the efficiency of the Pakistani military establishment, and this the military wished to forestall.

Once the military had taken power, they acted promptly to start economic development. A land reform program was introduced in West Pakistan, which now limits holdings to 500 acres of irrigated, or 1,000 acres of

nonirrigated, land (in practice these figures will be higher because of liberal exemptions). This figure contrasts with former holdings, which ranged as high as 350,000 acres for the head of one family in the area that used to be called Sind. By taking over land in excess of these amounts, in return for deferred compensation payments, the government hopes to acquire about 3 million acres for distribution to landless peasants. The government has also set a minimum limit to holdings in order to ensure the existence of economically viable units. Compulsory consolidation of landholdings has been ordered to eliminate present fractional holdings.

The action of the military, in short, removed from power the core members of the old elite, and replaced them largely with representatives of the industrial and commercial sectors of the economy. An all-out effort at economic development is under way, and basic reforms have been undertaken in administration, education and the judiciary. Incentives are offered to manufacturers to increase their exports, and more thorough controls have been placed on imports, particularly on the issuance of import licenses, which under the previous regime had become a major channel for corruption. Requirements for foreign investors have been relaxed considerably in order to stimulate industrial growth. Taxes have been lowered on personal incomes in the high income brackets and on business profits for corporations, in order to provide further incentives.

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Should U.S. Envoys Be Professionals?

The Senate is getting tough about White House ambassadorial appointments. Why? For this there are several reasons.

The first and possibly most important reason is entirely personal. It has to do with the chairmanship of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which early this year went to Senator J. William Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, former Rhodes scholar, ex-university president, a man with a keen mind, a sharp tongue and an instinct for probing. Some of his predecessors—nonagenarian Senator Theodore Francis Green, Democrat of Rhode Island, and Senator Alexander Wiley, Republican of Wisconsin, both good men, did not urgently seek to improve foreign service appointments.

Senator Fulbright has long worked to increase the ratio of professional to political appointees among the country's mission chiefs. Now that he is in the driver's seat of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee he is pursuing his goal with fresh energy. The chairman is not the whole committee, but a determined chairman can set its tone and often shape its decisions.

Then there is a general "trend" to consider. Very definitely the trend in ambassadorial appointments is toward more and more professionals—that is, members of the Foreign Service corps, trained in diplomatic work and with experience in many a foreign assignment. Back in 1924 career men held only about one-third of the top posts abroad. At that time, of 51 such posts, career men held only 18. By 1940 the division was about equal, with 31 career men holding mission chief posts, and 27

noncareer appointees listed. Recent figures show that the percentage of career men has increased to 69 percent, or 51 out of 74. In this 35-year period the percentage of career men has moved steadily upward from roughly one-third to over two-thirds, and there is no reason to expect that the trend has reached its peak.

Need for Experts

Thus the closer scrutiny of non-career men, or women, (and this is really what the headlines about Clare Boothe Luce and Ogden R. Reid were about) is part of the increasing senatorial insistence on professional diplomatic qualifications for ambassadorial appointments. Other things being equal—which of course they never are—the Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate as a whole are coming to believe that Foreign Service officers as a rule make better diplomats than political amateurs.

This growing concern about the need for expertness in ambassadorial posts was expressed by Senator Fulbright after the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 10 to 4, had overriden his opposition to the nomination of Ogden R. Reid, former president and editor of the *New York Herald Tribune*, as Ambassador to Israel, and the Senate by a voice vote had confirmed Mr. Reid's nomination on June 4. Senator Fulbright had opposed the appointment of Mr. Reid as an example of the inexperienced noncareer appointee who, he believes, should be kept out of ambassadorial posts. "Explosive and unstable conditions" in the Middle East, said Fulbright, are a threat to United States security. "To send an untried and inexperienced representative to

this area is, I believe, improvident and irresponsible."

There are, of course, exceptions in noncareer ranks. Some political appointees have made excellent ambassadors. Some have stuck to diplomacy long enough to rank almost as professionals. In the past, however, it has been true that political appointments were generally made more as rewards for the appointees' contributions to party campaign chests than as recognition of foreign experience or understanding of international problems. It is well recognized that some posts have to go to well-to-do political appointees—London and Paris, for example—for few if any career men have the personal income necessary to maintain those posts, and the House Appropriations Committee shows no inclination to increase living allowances so that these high-cost posts could be opened to any Foreign Service man.

Politics enter into approval of ambassadorial appointments, although not always openly. The present big Democratic majority in Congress makes it particularly tempting for Democratic Senators to explore the financial contributions of prospective ambassadors to the Republican party chest as well as their professional competence.

Close scrutiny of prospective ambassadors is really nothing new in our history. One of the more famous instances was the appointment of Martin Van Buren to the Court of St. James in 1832. The Senate rejected him, with John C. Calhoun gloating, "This will kill him, sir, kill him dead!" Five years later Van Buren was elected President.

NEAL STANFORD

Dulles and History

by James Reston

Out of the many newspaper articles appraising the contribution of John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State from 1953 to 1959, the Foreign Policy Association has selected James Reston's article "Dulles and History," which appeared in The New York Times of April 16, 1959, for excerpting in the BULLETIN.

WASHINGTON, April 15.—The historic assessment of John Foster Dulles, 69th Secretary of State of the United States, started today and will probably continue as long as this turbulent era of American history is studied.

Other men in other times will decide where he is to be placed along with Henry L. Stimson, Frank B. Kellogg, Charles Evans Hughes, John Hay and the other illustrious Republican Secretaries of State of this century. But in the moment of his resignation and personal tragedy, there seemed to be widespread agreement on these points:

Secretary of Transition

Mr. Dulles was the Secretary of the vast transition from Republican nationalism to Republican internationalism: the man who came here to establish a bipartisan internationalist policy in the Presidential election of 1944 and remained to help guide it, first as the agent of his party, then as consultant to Secretaries Stettinius, Marshall, Byrnes and Acheson, and finally as one of the most powerful Secretaries of State in United States history.

He measured the depth of the Communist challenge better than any Western statesman in office since Sir Winston Churchill, but did not

attain his objectives of keeping Communist power out of the Middle East, and rolling back Communist power in Europe and the Far East.

Finally, while his qualities as a formulator of policy and tactician are still part of the contemporary political controversy, he was widely regarded as one of the finest negotiators of his time.

Talented Negotiator

It is as a negotiator of Western policy that his talents are most likely to be missed in the coming months of diplomatic activity with the Soviet Union....

Indeed, this was the quality that brought him to Washington in the first place and has largely contributed to his record here. From his arrival here in 1944, he has been the advocate in the middle of powerful and contending personal and political forces.

He had to persuade the late Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan to adopt internationalist policies without getting into trouble with Senators Robert A. Taft of Ohio, Eugene Millikin of Colorado, and Styles Bridges of New Hampshire, all Republicans, who were not yet ready in 1944-45 to go so far.

He had to make his way through the conference of the formation of the United Nations in San Francisco in 1945 as a representative of a Democratic Administration without being accused of deserting the Republican party.

After the war, he was taken into the State Department as a representative of the Republican party without the consent of that party, and he carried on this delicate dual role most

of the time until 1952, when he was finally appointed Secretary of State by President Eisenhower.

Ambivalent Position

It is only against the background of this ambivalent position between 1944 and 1952 that any of the controversies surrounding Mr. Dulles since 1952 can be understood.

He has, for more than six years, been the leading expert on foreign policy for a people that approved of bold statements of defiance to the Communist world, yet like the President and Administration he represented, wanted peace above everything except honor.

During this period, he has been the leader of a coalition of nations with varied national interests and attitudes toward the Communist menace: some of them colonial powers, some anticolonial, some far removed from the periphery of the Communist empire, some close by.

In his own party and in the opposition, which has controlled Congress for years, there have been powerful men who wanted him to do more than he was doing to preserve freedom, and others who thought he should do less.

This had led him as Secretary of State, either consciously or unconsciously, to adopt what has often seemed to be a dualistic strategy. In his proclamations he has usually been extremely bold and in his policy operations he has usually been much more cautious and subtle.

Thus, he proclaimed a policy of "unleashing Chiang Kai-shek" in 1953, but quietly negotiated an arrangement whereby the Nationalist

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South Vietnam: A Success Story

by Ralph Lee Smith

Mr. Smith writes frequently on politics and public affairs. His articles have appeared in *The Atlantic*, *Reader's Digest*, *The Reporter*, *The New Leader*, and many other publications. He has recently completed the research for a book on Vietnam which will be published next year by Coward-McCann, Inc.

On July 21 South Vietnam will be five years old. The people of this doughty little nation have seen an extraordinary number of things happen in a brief span of time.

When Vietnam, at the Geneva conference in 1954, was divided at the 17th parallel, few observers believed that a viable nation could be molded out of the southern half. Five years later, the Republic of Vietnam has laid strong foundations for its national existence. During the second half of its first decade, it plans to devote its energies to the solution of critical economic and political problems. Its efforts will certainly be watched in Asia and, in fact, throughout the world.

South Vietnam was fortunate in producing an able national leader at the time it won its independence. When the Geneva conference was held, the country's nominal ruler was the French-supported Emperor Bao Dai, who spent most of his time on the Riviera. A few weeks before the conclusion of negotiations, Bao Dai had dispatched Ngo Dinh Diem, a respected expatriate, to Saigon as premier. In the ensuing months of national danger and near-chaos, Diem played a totally unanticipated role of daring and sophistication.

Diem is a member of a distinguished mandarin family from the shrine city of Hué. His father had been a minister and adviser to the Vietnamese Emperor Than Thai. Diem attracted attention as a young man in the civil administration, and was appointed Minister of the Interior in 1933. However, he resigned

after only two months in office when he found that the government did not intend to give him latitude to eliminate corruption or to modernize the bureaucracy.

In 1945 the leaders of the Communist-dominated independence movement wooed Diem, but he refused to participate in the government they had proclaimed in the north. Similarly in 1948 he refused to head the provisional puppet government set up in the south by the French under Emperor Bao Dai. Diem left Vietnam, traveling first to the United States, where he stayed two years, and then to France. In 1954, when Bao Dai again turned to him on the eve of the Geneva settlement, Diem finally accepted direction of the South Vietnam government.

A Wrecked Country

The new nation's problems were such as to defy the understanding of people accustomed to living under stable governments. The Geneva agreements ended ten years of devastating warfare. The partition was so intrinsically damaging to both sections of the country that the great powers regarded it simply as an interim measure for the restoration of peace. The industrial north, with approximately 13 million people, was severed from the agricultural south with close to 12 million. Elections were scheduled to be held in July 1956 for the reunification of the country. Little seemed to stand in the way of a clear triumph for the Communists, who controlled the north under the government of na-

tional liberation leader Ho Chi Minh.

Bao Dai's government in the south inherited a jumbled administrative and financial wreckage. Little native talent had been developed during France's long colonial rule, which had begun in the 1860's, and much of what was available had joined Ho Chi Minh. Corruption dominated the government structure at every level. The withdrawal of French armed forces and of a substantial segment of French capital and economic enterprise added to the problems created by severance from northern industry. The land had lain fallow for many years during the war; agriculture was nearly at a standstill; and the countryside was in the hands of rebel armed forces.

Another desperate factor was the flood of refugees that poured in from the North before the Communists were able to seal off escape routes. A total of some 850,000 people descended on South Vietnam within a few months—perhaps the most concentrated refugee exodus of modern times. These refugees, in almost every case, were without money, food, or any other necessities of life.

Diem's Many Foes

A unique military situation placed the government in jeopardy from four distinct groups of armed forces. First, the retreating Vietminh armies left behind literally hundreds of arms caches and irregular partisans. Second, two powerful religious cults, the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao, maintained large, well-equipped private armies of their own. They controlled

the countryside, including the rich Mekong delta, and openly opposed the government. Third, another strong private army was maintained by a military crime syndicate, the Binh Xuyen. This group controlled gambling, prostitution, and opium distribution in Saigon, and had purchased control and operation of the Saigon police force from the French. The Binh Xuyen gave a portion of its proceeds to Bao Dai. It stood to lose everything if Diem triumphed, and was his implacable foe. Fourth, the Vietnamese government forces were led by General Nguyen Van Hinh who himself aspired to power, and who made his bid when the Binh Xuyen and the religious sects sought open combat.

Diem's Many Struggles

Diem's triumph over these many foes was one of his major achievements, and the one on which everything else depended. The struggle lasted for two years, although the decisive events took place during the early months, and before United States aid could become a decisive factor. Diem temporized, divided his foes, won some allies, secured the loyalty of many unit commanders of the Vietnamese army, and won desperate crucial engagements, one in the streets of Saigon. His success was a major factor in the decision of the United States to discontinue channeling aid to Vietnam through the French and to make it available directly to the Diem government. During its first phases, the United States aid program was devoted almost entirely to support of the armed forces and resettlement of refugees.

Diem built his government while he was engaged in these struggles. He severed the Vietnam currency, the *piaster*, from the French franc, and turned the French-owned Bank of Indochina into the National Bank of Vietnam. Ruling with a small

group of persons outside the circle of corruption, he instituted extensive cleanups and reforms. He flatly refused to hold the scheduled unification elections, asserting that no free vote was then possible for the people of North Vietnam. Instead, he conducted a national referendum on October 23, 1955, asking the people to choose between himself and Bao Dai as their chief of state. Riding a wave of popularity, he won by a 90 to 1 ratio. Diem thereupon proclaimed a republic and assumed the office of president. He then called for a second round of national elections to choose a constituent assembly to draft a constitution. These elections were held on March 4, 1956. The assembly thus chosen drafted a constitution which was promulgated on October 26, 1956, and the constituent assembly was transformed into the National Assembly.

During this period vast programs were undertaken to resettle the refugees. As soon as portions of the countryside were made secure from rebel armed forces, land reform was instituted, and tracts of several acres were made available to the refugees, along with necessary implements, supplies, and credits to begin their new life.

Land Reform

Vietnam's land reform program was modeled to some extent on the programs which had been carried out after World War II in Japan and Taiwan. Wolf Ladejinsky, who had played a prominent role in the Japan and Taiwan planning, became Diem's chief economic adviser for land reform in Vietnam. All holdings in excess of 245 acres must be surrendered to the government for redistribution to the tenants or landless cultivators. Landowners are reimbursed, receiving 10 percent of the value of their land in cash, and the rest in bonds which can be used to

buy shares in government-owned industries or to pay taxes. In this way, land reform and reinvestment in industry are accomplished simultaneously. The program will ultimately result in the resettlement of about 3 million Vietnamese on land which they will own.

When the fertile Mekong River delta was wrested from Hoa Hao troops, a great redevelopment project was started. Known as the Caisan project, it involved the opening of old canals, the digging of new ones, and the settlement of refugees on 7.5 acre tracts. By 1957 enough rice was being grown in the Mekong delta to supply Vietnam's own population and to provide a substantial surplus for export.

United States Aid

The army was reorganized and trained under United States guidance, and reduced to half its former size. American aid was indispensable to the country's survival and, on the whole, was planned and administered with considerable skill and success. In 1957, United States aid paid for half the government budget, including the full payroll of the armed forces, and covered nearly three-fourths of the nation's imports.

With the opening of the rice fields and the return of the country to a self-sustaining agricultural economy, an increasing measure of stability was attained. As early as two years ago the government began to study the problems which will be its major concern during the years immediately ahead. Vietnam's resources are primarily agricultural. Few areas in Asia have such a favorable ratio of land to population. Before the war Vietnam exported rice and rubber in an intensive two-crop economy. France underwrote its foreign trade deficit.

The rebuilding of these two crops for export is a keystone in the gov-

Government's current efforts to pay its own way in world trade. Both the strength and vulnerability of such an economy have been demonstrated within the past two years. In 1957 exports of both crops were sizable, but in 1958 a poor crop and the world recession created serious difficulties.

While these two products have been intensively cultivated, Vietnam has found it necessary to import many agricultural commodities which might well be grown at home. One phase of the government's attack on its trade deficit, therefore, has been concerned with broadening the base of domestic agricultural production.

North of the Mekong delta are a series of uplands and plateaus which have not previously been cultivated. Through ancient custom, Vietnamese farmers have confined themselves to raising rice in the lowlands. In 1956 a United Nations survey team confirmed the potential capacity of these uplands to provide a more diversified agriculture.

The government has embarked on a large-scale resettlement program aimed at producing a broad variety of food staples in the rich plateau areas. This program requires the introduction of new crops, the development of new skills, and the breaking of centuries-old customs. The success of these efforts will have an important effect on Vietnam's balance of trade and on the problems created by an agricultural system based on a single food crop.

Lack of Manufacturing

Another major factor in Vietnam's foreign trade, as well as in its domestic economy, has been its almost complete lack of manufacturing facilities. The country lacks the resources for heavy industry, but offers many opportunities for the development of lighter manufacturing enterprises

based on readily available raw materials.

Power is a major problem, Vietnam has one coal mine, no oil as far as anyone knows, and a hydroelectric potential which is promising but would require vast sums of capital to develop.

A start has been made, however, in the development of certain light industries. Intensive efforts are being deployed to attract foreign capital, and in some instances these efforts have been successful. The building of a textile mill, a sugar mill, a glass factory, a fish processing plant, and a pharmaceuticals factory are now under way. Factories for producing paper and building board from Vietnam's rich forest resources were recommended by the UN survey team, and are being eagerly sought by the government.

Future development will depend in considerable measure on Vietnam's success in attracting capital on a scale sufficient to develop an adequate basis for domestic production. The government has passed many laws providing for investment opportunities, either wholly developed by foreign capital or developed by foreign capital in conjunction with government investment. It is, of course, true that private capital in the wealthier nations of the West can usually find investment opportunities at home. Moreover, the creation of the industries which would be most desirable in a balanced development plan does not always bring a rapid return on investment. The next four or five years will show whether Vietnam can fulfill its ambitious hopes for investment of foreign capital in its economy.

Despite its vulnerability to world prices and conditions, Vietnam must make intensive efforts in the next few years to increase substantially exports of its two basic crops—rice and rubber. This is particularly true for the

immediate future, when United States aid will diminish and Vietnam will have few other products it can sell to compensate for the resulting decline in revenues.

Political Problems

At the present time no alternative to Diem's rule exists in Vietnam, nor have conditions been such as to foster a broader basis of participation in the decision-making processes of his government. This situation challenges the vision and ability of Vietnam's leaders in the years immediately ahead. The relaxation of security measures and the grant to the press of more liberal rights of expression and dissent would be important steps toward strengthening Vietnamese democracy.

President Diem and the members of the government have been deeply preoccupied by the need for a unified cultural and intellectual alternative to the challenge of communism, and are convinced that the country's survival will depend on its success in formulating such an alternative. Diem himself subscribes to a philosophy which he terms "personalism," and which involves strong emphasis on the development of the individual as the end and justification of government. If Diem is able to evolve a workable democratic political structure in Vietnam, his example would carry great weight in Asia.

READING SUGGESTIONS: Francis J. Corley, "Viet-Nam Since Geneva," *Thought* (Fordham University Quarterly, Winter 1958-59); John C. Donnell, "National Renovation Campaigns in Vietnam," *Pacific Affairs*, March 1959; John T. Dorsey, Jr., "South Viet-Nam in Perspective," *Far Eastern Survey*, December 1958; Gilbert Jonas, ed., *Investment Conditions in the Republic of Vietnam: A Symposium Based on a Conference Sponsored by the American Friends of Vietnam* (New York, American Friends of Vietnam, 1958).

Reston

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leader agreed not to invade the Chinese mainland without United States support.

The proclamation pleased those Senators who favored a bold and even chancy policy against the Chinese Communists, while the more cautious policy of quietly putting Chiang Kai-shek back on the leash placated those allies who feared a war with Peiping.

Similarly, Mr. Dulles spoke often in 1952 and 1953 about substituting a policy of "liberation" of the Communist satellite nations for the Truman policy of "containing the expansion" of Communist imperialism, but he very carefully avoided any action that would have risked a major war when the Hungarian patriots revolted against their Communist masters.

Again, when his policy of "massive retaliation" against the Communists was announced to the pleasure of extreme anti-Communists, he gradually amended it later to meet the protests of those who thought he had gone too far.

Inevitably, this led him into stormy water, sometimes with those who liked his pronouncements but criticized his operations, sometimes with those who liked his flexibility of operation but disliked his threats and warnings.

It has been an article of faith with Mr. Dulles ever since the end of the last war that no enemy would make general war on the West if the United States made clear in advance that the American nation had the will and

the power to oppose that aggression by force of arms.

Accordingly, he has consistently warned Moscow and Peiping, often to the despair of his allies, that military action against any region vital to the security of the United States would lead to war.

Linked to this policy of confronting the enemy with stern alternatives—what has been called "brinkmanship"—has been another Dulles idea, even more controversial.

This is that the internal pressures within the Communist satellites and even within the Soviet Union and Communist China were so great that, if the West could only prevent a general war, these Communist societies would eventually break up their own inner contradictions.

History may yet prove this assumption to be true, but the general feeling here is that the Communist states are stronger now, even in Eastern Europe, than they were when Mr. Dulles became Secretary of State in 1952.

As the son of a Presbyterian minister, the grandson of the 44th Secretary of State, John W. Foster, and the nephew of the 57th, Robert Lansing of New York, he has strong personal convictions of right and wrong, and complete confidence that his experience, going back more than 50 years to The Hague Conference of 1907, is greater than anybody else's.

As a result, the recommendations he took to the President about intervening in Indochina, disengaging in Korea and Suez, were very largely the result of his own judgments, and no President ever followed his Secretary of State more consistently.

Outside of the recommendation to risk military action in Indochina, President Eisenhower has almost always followed him explicitly. Of all his Cabinet officers, Mr. Dulles has been the most effective advocate in the National Security Council meetings, in the Cabinet and in their many private policy discussions.

Accordingly, it will be a long time before anybody can play precisely the Dulles role in Washington, and probably it will not be seen again in this Administration.

Maron

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For the future, the success of the new elite will depend to a large extent on how skillful it proves in broadening its base to include representatives of peasants and of labor who could share with the military and with businessmen responsibility for the healthy and balanced development of Pakistan's economy.

Dr. Maron, now teaching in Mexico, was lecturer in philosophy at the University of Dacca (East Pakistan) from 1951 to 1953, then research anthropologist at the University of California in Berkeley, and associate research director for the Human Relations Area Files, Yale University.

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